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Judicial independence is declared as a primary law obligation to be respected by every national body which may apply or 
interpret European Union law. Recent legislative reforms of national judicial systems in Poland and other Member States 
undermine the principles of judicial independence and mutual trust and raise the idea of a rule of law crisis, claiming for 
an intervention of the European Union.
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Teisinės valstybės krizė Europos Sąjungoje:  
nuo Portugalijos iki Lenkijos (ir už jos ribų)
Teismų nepriklausomumas yra deklaruojamas kaip pirminis teisės įpareigojimas, kurio turi laikytis kiekviena nacionalinė 
institucija, galinti taikyti ar aiškinti Europos Sąjungos teisę. Naujausios nacionalinių teismų sistemų įstatymų reformos 
Lenkijoje ir kitose valstybėse narėse pažeidžia teismų nepriklausomumo ir abipusio pasitikėjimo principus ir kelia teisinės 
valstybės idėjos krizę, reikalaudamos Europos Sąjungos įsikišimo.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: teisinė valstybė, Europos Sąjunga, teismų sistemos reformos, teismų nepriklausomumas, abipusis 
pasitikėjimas.
1. European Union of law
In 1986, the Court of Justice declared that the European Economic Community, now European Union, 
was a “community based on the rule of law”, clarifying that “neither its Member States nor its institutions 
can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the 
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basic constitutional charter, the Treaty”2. Les Verts judgment expressly introduced the concept of rule 
of law into the Union’s legal order, recognizing the existence of a rule of law governing the ordering 
of powers and institutional balance and allowing individuals to assert their rights, which is why it is 
argued that, from that moment, the Union lives with a constitution3.
The importance of the rule of law is, therefore, underlined as a constituent element of greater 
political integration. As enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), it integrates 
the range of values  upon which the Union is founded, supports the procedure laid down in Article 7 
TEU4 and constitutes a condition for accession of new Member States to the Union (Article 49 TEU). 
The principle of the rule of law requires the guarantee of effective judicial protection as well, foreseen 
in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) and, particularly, 
access to justice, an essential requirement of any democracy5. In this regard, the Treaty of Lisbon 
established in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Member States’ obligation to provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure  legal protection in fields covered by European Union law, reinforcing 
what was already the result of the sincere cooperation principle provided for in Article 4(3) TEU.
In fact, at the moment of their accession to the Union, Member States accepted and committed to 
ensure the primacy and effectiveness of EU law, whose functioning depends on a decentralized archi-
tecture that places national courts and tribunals and other bodies as its guardians. As a consequence, 
the safeguard of the rule of law relies on the efforts of Member States and European Union institu-
tions. Such provision in article 19 TEU emphasizes this obligation, without apparently showing any 
innovative perspective until its invocation in the case Association of Portuguese Judges6 to monitor 
the independence of national courts and tribunals.
As a matter of fact, one of the requirements of the rule of law is judicial independence, which is 
known for the important role in the development of the notion of ‘national court or tribunal’7. Judges’ 
impartiality and irremovability is determinant for a national body to refer questions to the Court of 
Justice for preliminary rulings and for the implementation of the principle of mutual trust.
The current state of art, the so-called European rule of law crisis8, is characterized by significant 
legislative amendments affecting Member States judiciary and their judicial independence and, con-
sequently, jeopardizing the rule of law, which justified the inauguration of a new era by the Court of 
Justice, preparing its own intervention in such judicial system reforms9.
2 Judgment of 23-04-1986, Les Verdes, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, paragraph 23.
3 RAMOS, R. M. A reforma institucional e a Constituição Europeia. In Uma Constituição para a Europa – Colóquio 
Internacional de Lisboa, 2004, Almedina, p. 119.
4 Regarding this procedure, see COLI, M. Article 7 TEU: From a Dormant Provision to an Active Enforcement 
Tool? Perspectives on Federalism, 2018, 10(3), p. 272–303.
5 LENAERTS, K. Le Traité de Lisbonne et la protection juridictionnelle des particuliers en droit de l’Union. Cahi-
ers de Droit Européen, 2009, 45(5–6), p. 709.
6 Judgment of 27-02-2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117.
7 According, for instance, to Judgment of 17-09-1997, Dorsch Consult, C-54/96, EU:C:1997:413.
8 MICHELOT, M. How Can Europe Repair Breaches of the Rule of Law? Jacques Delors Institute, Policy Paper, 
n.º 221, 2018.
9 Cfr. OVÁDEK, M. Has the CJEU just Reconfigured the EU Constitutional Order? Verfassungsblogm, 2018.
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2. The importance of judicial independence in the European Union – 
the renewing Judgment Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses
Already considered as a new milestone in the construction of the European Union law10, the As-
sociação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses ruling is based on the adoption of legislative measures to 
eliminate Portugal’s excessive budget deficit, among which a temporary reduction of salary of office 
holders and employees performing duties in the public sector was foreseen (Law no. 75/2014 of 12 of 
September), which affected the judges of the Tribunal de Contas (‘Court of Auditors’). Representing 
these judges, the Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses brought a special administrative action 
before the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (‘Supreme Administrative Court’) seeking the annulment 
of the administrative measures adopted by virtue of such law, grounded on the breach of the principle 
of judicial independence enshrined not only in the Portuguese Constitution, but also in the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. Faced with those circumstances the 
Supremo Tribunal Administativo stayed the proceedings and referred its interpretation doubts to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
In this judgment, the Court developed an impressive construction based on States’ obligation to 
ensure that the bodies, forming part of their remedies system satisfied effective protection require-
ments. Recalling the notion of a national court within the meaning of European Union law, the Court 
of Justice underlined the importance of judicial independence, “inherent to the task of judging”11, as 
one of the elements to be considered. As a decisive factor, the Court examined whether the national 
measure undermined the irremovability of the members of the Portuguese Court, concluding that such 
measure was limited, transitory and adopted in the context of a financial assistance programme and 
had general nature, targeting “different holders of public office and persons who perform functions in 
the public sector, including representatives of the legislative, executive and judicial branches”12, and 
therefore did not prejudice the independence of the Tribunal de Contas judges.
Despite the concision of the Court of Justice, it developed a complex position. In this case, the 
Court did not take a stance on the debate on the application of the austerity measures in the field of 
the Union13 (important to determine the application of the Charter), and preferred to focus on the 
application of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
In a surprising speech, the Court created a “new legal sphere”14, stating that “with regard to the 
ratione materiae scope <...>, that provision [of the TEU] refers to ‘areas covered by Union law’, ir-
respective of the situation in which the Member States apply that right, within the meaning of Article 
51(1) of the Charter”15.  In other words, the Court affirmed that the material scope of Article 19(1), 
second subparagraph, TEU (“the fields covered by Union law”) is autonomous and broader16 than the 
10 Ibidem. See, as well, SILVEIRA, A.; FROUFE, P.; PEREZ, S.; and ABREU, J. União de direito para além do 
direito da União – as garantias de independência judicial no acórdão Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. Jugar 
Online, 2018.
11 Judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., paragraph 43.
12 Ibidem, paragraphs 45–51.
13 Contrary to Judgment of 13-06-2017, Florescu, C-256/14, EU:C:2017:448.
14 BONELLI, M.; CLAES, M. Case Note: Judicial serendipity: how Portuguese judges came to rescue the Polish 
judiciary. European Comstitutional Law Review, 2018, 14(3), p. 630.
15 Acórdão Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., n.º 29.
16 Cfr. Opinion of 11-04-2019, European Comission Comissão Europeia/Republic of Poland, C-619/18, 
EU:C:2019:325, paragraphs 55–57. See also PIGNARRE, P.-E. Does the end justify the means? In Robert Schuman 
Iniative Blog, 2018; and SILVEIRA, A.; FROUFE, P.; PEREZ, S.; and ABREU, J. União de direito <...>, p. 6.
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material scope of the Charter, which, according to its Article 51(1) is applicable to “the Member States 
only when they implement Union law”.
Nevertheless, the Court’s silence on the applicability of the Charter and on the integration of the 
national measure in a field covered by European Union law could be interpreted as a restraint17 due to 
the lack of clarity in the distinction between the two mentioned material scopes, especially after the 
Fransson case-law, which indicated that “[s]ince the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter 
must therefore be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union 
law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those 
fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability 
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. The applicability of European Union law entails 
applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter”18.
In accordance with the position of the Court of Justice, there was no need to verify whether Portugal 
was applying Union law, and it was sufficient to determine whether the Portuguese Court of Auditors 
was a part of the system of remedies which ensures effective judicial protection in the fields covered 
by Union law and, as so, must comply with the necessary requirements arising from Article 19(1) TEU. 
Based on the autonomous notion of a national court or tribunal, the Court of Justice declared that 
independence affects the national duty to ensure that the bodies which integrate the remedies system 
satisfy the effective judicial requirements.
Regarding the innovative character of this Judgment, it is important to point out that the Court 
did not have to adopt this position. The sub judice case could be analysed on the basis of the Charter 
because the national measure was adopted following Union law19. Since Portugal was implementing 
such law, the path drawn up by the Court led to speculation about its true intention20.
Undoubtedly, the Portuguese case-law created a new era, a new sphere of European Union law, 
extending its scope and allowing the Court of Justice to rule on national measures affecting the inde-
pendence of national courts, even if the national measure is not implementing Union law. Since national 
judicial organization was a matter excluded from the scope of the Union, this interpretation is only 
supported by the fact that Union law application or interpretation may be entrusted to national courts or 
tribunals and, as so, they must fulfil the necessary requirements to ensure an effective protection thereof.
The European scenario is marked by certain reforms of national judicial systems that are not aligned 
with the principle of judicial independence, which has increased the idea of a  rule of law crisis21, and 
in this matter the Portuguese case constitutes an invitation for the European Commission to act and 
create a precedent for the Court of Justice’s monitoring of the legislative reforms in Poland22 and other 
Member States23, which means that the Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses case-law can act 
as an antechamber for the Union’s intervention in such legislative changes of the national judiciary.
17 Described as an elegant solution for the Advocate General in Opinion European Comission/Republic of Poland, 
C-619/18, paragraph 58.
18 Judgment of 26-02-2013, Fransson, case C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 21.
19 Cfr. Opinion of 18-05-2017, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2017:395, paragraphs 
43–53. See BONELLI, M.; CLAES, M. Case Note <...>, p. 625–628.
20 See SILVEIRA, A.; FROUFE, P.; PEREZ, S.; and ABREU, J. União de direito <...>, p. 4.
21 See BOGDANDY, A. von; BOGDANOWICZ, P.; CANOR, I.; TABOROWSKI, M.; SCHMIDT, M. A Potential 
Constitutional Moment for the European Rule of Law – The Importance of Red Lines. Common Market Law Review, 
2018, 55, p. 1–14; and TABOROWSKI, M. CJEU Opens the Door for the Commission to Reconsider Charges against 
Poland. Verfassungsblog, 2018.
22 TABOROWSKI, M. CJEU Opens the Door <...>.
23 Regarding Hungary, see MICHELOT, M. How Can Europe. <...>; and DUARTE, M. C. Hungria: O Estado de 
Direito em Crise? Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Política 2018, 9, p. 13–30.
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3. From the influence of the Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses  
case-law to the monitoring of the Polish judicial reform
In the European spotlight, the reform of the Polish judicial system established significant changes24, 
such as the changes to the constitutional role of the National Council for the Judiciary in safeguarding 
independence of the judiciary; Polish Government’s invalid appointments to the Trybunał Konstytucyjny 
(Constitutional Tribunal) and its refusal to publish certain judgments, the fact that the Minister of 
Justice is also the Public Prosecutor, playing an active role in prosecutions and a disciplinary role in 
respect of presidents of courts; and the determination of a new age of compulsory retirement of the 
Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court).
The changes provoked serious consequences, affecting judicial independence, the principle of mutual 
trust and the rule of law. Starting with the implication of the principle of mutual trust, the recognition 
of arrest warrants issued by other Member Stares was established as the “first concrete measure in the 
criminal field implementing the principle of mutual recognition”25, something which requires a high 
degree of trust between States which is only possible when they respect common conditions, such as 
judicial independence.
Such concern has guided Koen Lenaerts’ recent speeches. In his words, the independence of the 
courts is a “precondition”26 in their dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
Members States’ bodies, which should be measured in two dimensions. Internally, the national court 
will have to act impartially in the judgment of the cause and, externally, it is necessary to respect a sep-
aration of powers that prevents external influences in the decision-making and ensure the absence of any 
hierarchical or subordination relationship with another body or entity and guarantees of irremovability.
This condition has particular relevance in the context of the Framework Decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant, since the execution of warrants depends on a high level of confidence. As a consequence, 
violations of the rule of law and judicial independence have also served as grounds for challenging the 
principle of mutual trust in the enforcement of the European Arrest Warrant27. In Judgment Minister 
for Justice and Equality/LM28, it was questioned whether the executing Member State should consider 
Member States’ current situation, namely the existence of a genuine risk of violation of Article 47 
of the Charter, before delivering the individual in respect to whom the warrant has been issued, for 
the purposes of prosecuting, to the authorities of the other Member State (the issuing Member State).
Despite the lack of courage to formally emphasize, contrary to what happened in Judgment Aranyosi 
and Căldăraru29, that the national judicial authority must postpone the decision on the surrender of the 
individual concerned until it obtains information regarding the existence of risk of fundamental rights 
or violation of the rule of law, the Court of Justice ruled that, “on account of systemic or generalized 
deficiencies so far as concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary”, the national 
24 About Polish rule of law crisis, see, for instance, PECH, L.; and WACHOWIEC, P. 1095 Days Later: From Bad 
to Worse Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland (Part I). Verfassungsblog, 2019.
25 PATERSON, N.; and VERMEULEN, G. Mutual recognition, prisioner transfer & sentence execution in the Eu-
ropean Union – A journey bound for choppy waters? EU Criminal Justice, Financial & Economic Crime: New Perspec-
tives, ed. Marc Cools et al., 2011, p. 41.
26 LENAEETS, K. The Court of Justice and national courts: a dialogue based on mutual trust and judicial indepen-
dence. Speech at the Supreme Administrative Court of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, 2018.
27 See BERTRAND, J. The Rule of Law in Poland and the European Arrest Warrant: A Blessing in Disguise? Ox-
ford Human Rights Hub, 2018.
28 Judgment 25-07-2018, Minister for Justice and Equality/LM, C 216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586.
29 Judgment 5-04-2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C-404/15 e C-659/15 PPU, no. 104.
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authority “must determine, specifically and precisely, whether <…> there are substantial grounds for 
believing that that person will run such a risk if he is surrendered to that State”30.
In fact, the violation of the rule of law by Poland had implications as regards implementation of the 
foundation stone of judicial cooperation, threatening the proper functioning of Union law and seriously 
compromising mutual trust, which cannot be understood as “blind trust”31. Due to its serious impact 
on the rule of law and respect for judicial independence, the legislative reform of the Polish judiciary 
motivated the Commission to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 7 (1) TEU and intervene due 
to the manifest risk of a serious breach of the rule of law, and since Poland failed to take any steps 
to resolve the risk of a serious breach, the Commission decided to bring another infringement action 
against Poland for failure to fulfill its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
and Article 47 of the Charter on the grounds of reducing the retirement age of Supreme Court judges 
and granting the President of the Republic of Poland the power to extend the active service of those 
judges. Those national measures would constitute a breach of the values  referred to in Article 2 TEU 
and more specifically of the rule of law and judicial independence as a guarantee of effective protection 
in fields covered by European Union law.
At a first glimpse, such legislative change was not integrated in the fields covered by Union law, 
because it is a matter reserved to Member States. However, the Commission took advantage of the 
Court’s encouragement in the case of the Portuguese judges, and the conclusions of Advocate Gen-
eral Tanchev32 indicated that the Portuguese courts had opened the door for European intervention in 
relation to the Polish judges. Same class, different contexts, a new era. It seems that the conditions 
to declare the incompatibility of the Polish reforms with the rule of law were met, since the position 
adopted in the Portuguese case extended the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (and the European 
Union’s competence) to the supervision of the judicial organization of Member States33, which was 
classically understood as a competence excluded from the sphere of the Union.
According to the Court’s point of view, the fundamental right to effective judicial protection includes 
not only the duty to ensure the necessary remedies for individual protection in the fields covered by 
European Union law, but also the obligation to guarantee that such remedies respect the requirement 
of judicial independence. Unexpectedly, the independence of the courts has become a requirement for 
all those national bodies which can potentially be common courts of European Union law in the future.
Finally, on 24th June of this year, the Court of Justice ruled that the Polish law which lowers the 
retirement age of the Supreme Court judges is contrary to European Union law and breaches the principle 
of the irremovability of judges and judicial independence. The Court invoked the Venice Commis-
sion’s34 doubts regarding the reform of the retirement age as “side-lining a certain group of judges”35 
30 Judgment Minister for Justice and Equality/LM, paragraph 79. Regarding the impact of such judgment, see 
FRĄCKOWIAK-ADAMSKA, A. Mutual trust and independence of the judiciary after the CJEU judgment in LM – new 
era or business as usual? EU Law Analysis, 2018.
31 LENAEETS, K. La vie après l’avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust. Common Market Law 
Review, 2017, 54, p. 805–840.
32 Opinion of 11-04-2019, European Commission/ Republic of Poland, C-619/18, EU:C:2019:325.
33 Cfr. COLI, M. The Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses judgment: what role for the Court of Justice in the 
protection of EU values? Diritti Comparati, Working Papers, 2018.
34 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion no. 904/2017 (CDL-
AD(2017)031), on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending 
the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland; and on the Act on the organisation of Ordinary 
Courts, 11-12-2017.
35 Judgment European Commission/ Republic of Poland, paragraph 82.
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of that court and decided that the application of the national measure is not justified by a legitimate 
objective and the President of the Republic’s discretionary power to extend the period of activity of 
judges beyond the new retirement age is not governed by any objective and verifiable criterion and 
concluded that Poland breached the judicial independence and failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU36.
The ruling validated the doctrinal suspicions and demonstrated that Member States’ organization 
of justice, which is a national competence, can be assessed under Union law since they are required to 
comply with their obligations and ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by European 
Union law. As the Polish Supreme Court is a European Court, it must comply with the requirement of 
judicial independence. Such decision confirms that the independence of the national courts and tribunals 
is a requirement for all bodies which can potentially apply and interpret Union law.
4. Brief notes on the interpretation of the case-law  
of the second paragraph of Article 19(1) TEU
Deriving from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the obligation for Member States to 
ensure that all their courts and tribunals which can apply and interpret Union law offer guarantees of 
independence allowed a (re)interpretation of the scope of European Union law. Based on the potential 
application of such law, the Court encouraged the Commission’s initiative and prepared the future 
judgments in cases of breach of the rule of law for non-compliance with the necessary conditions for 
effective judicial protection.
The Court’s position in Judgment Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses has given new life to 
the mentioned provision of article 19 TEU and found a way for the European Union to control legislative 
changes37 which undermine founding values, which may be felt in similar cases of breach of the rule 
of law in the judicial system and used to protect the independence of court members and mutual trust. 
Yet, despite this welcomed contribution, there are some negative aspects that should be approached.
First of all, this is a risky interpretation, mainly because the organization of the national judiciary is 
(or was) a matter reserved to the States, and the position of the Court of Justice allows this interference 
on matters falling within the exclusive competence of Member States38. This is a serious issue because 
the European Union is formed by sovereign States, which relinquished spheres of sovereignty but did 
not create any Federal European State.
The control of the rule of law inaugurated by the Court allows to protect fundamental principles 
and rights at national level and to overcome the slowness and complexity associated with the operation 
of Article 7 TEU. However, if the legislator wanted to surround this procedure with precautions, has 
the Court not gone too far in the Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses case-law? To what extent 
is it possible or legitimate under the Treaties to judicially interfere in matters of an internal nature?39 
This is a meandering crossing, which will require a weighting and balancing, under penalty of Article 
19 (1) TEU to become a mechanism of forcible integration40, a source of construction of the “European 
judiciary”41.
36 Judgment European Commission/ Republic of Poland, paragraphs 96, 114 and 124.
37 BOGDANDY, A. von; BOGDANOWICZ, P.; CANOR, I.; TABOROWSKI, M.; SCHMIDT, M. <...>. p. 3.
38 OVÁDEK, M. Has he CJEU <...>.
39 See PIGNARRE, P.-E. Does the end <...>.
40 In this respect, see SILVEIRA, A.; FROUFE, P.; PEREZ, S.; and ABREU, J. União de direito <...>, p. 4.
41 BONELLI, M.; CLAES, M. Case Note <...>, p. 643.
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Secondly, this interpretation of the Court may have a discouraging effect on the mechanism provided 
for in Article 267 TFEU42. If it can be concluded that certain legislative changes have infringed ju-
dicial independence, some bodies may be excluded from the notion of ‘national court or tribunal’ on 
the basis of a reference for a preliminary ruling. This effect clearly seems to contradict the position of 
the Court and even the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law, since the Luxembourg Court has 
shown a concern to relax the interpretation of the ‘national court or tribunal’ notion in order to extend 
the competence to refer questions43, and the Strasbourg Court has already acknowledged the relevance 
of preliminary reference under the right to a fair trial, as provided for in the European Convention on 
Human Rights44.
Conclusions
As part of European identity45, judicial independence plays an unquestionable role in the protection 
of the rule of law, which has now been reinforced by the Court’s clarification that it is a requirement 
resulting from the obligation laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
Intentionally, the Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses case-law elevated to primary obliga-
tion the duty to ensure the judicial independence of bodies integrated in the national remedies system 
which contribute to effective judicial protection in the fields covered by Union law. As a result, the 
Judgment under consideration created a new era, extending the scope of European Union law to control 
national measures on judicial organizations affecting the independence of national courts, supported 
by the fact that Union law application or interpretation may be entrusted to them. This is certainly a 
delicate interpretation which creates a favourable precedent for the monitoring of the legislative reform 
of the judicial system in Poland and other States and constitutes an invitation for  the Commission to 
bring infringement proceedings46. However, such position may have undesirable effects, such as the 
influence on the subsumption of the notion of ‘national court or tribunal’ and the Court’s interference 
in matters of exclusively national competence.
More than an opportunity for the Court’s involvement in Poland’s rule of law crisis, the scope of 
Union Law has been rebuilt, leading it to the extreme47 and demonstrating how the Court is committed 
to upholding the principle of judicial independence in order to protect the rule of law and mutual trust.
As the Commission referred after the recent ruling on the Polish reform, this case-law is import-
ant for the protection of the judiciary in Poland and beyond48, confirming that Portugal operated as 
an antechamber for future interventions on Member States’ judiciary organization and reinforcing 
that the independence of the courts, as a result of the Court of Justice’s activism, can (and must) be a 
weapon at the service of the effectiveness of European Union law and protection of structural values 
and fundamental rights.
42 Ibidem, p. 637.
43 See for example paragaph 31 of Judgment Dorsch.
44 Judgment of ECHR, 30-07-2015, Ferreira Santos Pardal, 30123/10; and Judgment of ECHR,  20-09-2011, Ul-
lens de Schooten and Rezabek, 3989/07 and 38353/07.
45 LENAERTS, K. The Court of Justice <...>.
46 BONELLI, M.; CLAES, M. Case Note <...>, p. 636
47 Ibidem, p. 623.
48 European Commission statement on the Judgment of the European Court of Justice on Poland’s Supreme Court 
law, 24 June 2019. 
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The Rule of Law Crisis in the European Union: From Portugal to Poland (and Beyond)
Inês Pereira de Sousa 
(Católica University of Portugal)
S u m m a r y
Judicial independence plays an indisputable role regarding the rule of law, in the current European scenario. In fact, 
due to the activism of the Court of Justice, it was declared as a primary law obligation to be respected by every national 
body which may apply or interpret European Union law. In the light of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the 
Treaty on the European Union, Member States are obliged to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by 
European Union law and, according, to the Court’s position in Judgment Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses, all 
national courts and tribunals integrated in the national system of remedies which can act as a European ordinary court 
must observe certain  requirements arising from such effective protection, such as judicial independence. Only an impar-
tial and irremovable body can guarantee individual protection and institutional trust, fundamental in the Union of law.
Recent legislative reforms of national judicial systems in Poland and other Member States undermine the principles 
of judicial independence and mutual trust and raise the idea of a rule of law crisis, claiming for an intervention of the 
European Union. In this regard, the Court of Justice used the Portuguese judges’ case-law to extend the scope of Union 
law and find a way to put Member States’ judicial organization under its control. Therefore, this jurisprudence emerged 
as an antechamber for the Court’s intervention in the Polish rule of law breach regarding recent legislative changes on 
the national judiciary.
Both cases are marked by legislative alterations which affect judges. Same class, different contexts, which allowed 
the world to witness the first steps of a new era which, on the one hand, can curb the violation of such structural value, 
but, on the other hand, can force a further integration of Member States.
Teisinės valstybės krizė Europos Sąjungoje: nuo Portugalijos iki Lenkijos (ir už jos ribų)
Inês Pereira de Sousa 
(Portugalijos katalikų universitetas)
S a n t r a u k a
Teismų nepriklausomumas yra neginčijamas teisinės valstybės principas pagal dabartinį Europos scenarijų. Ir iš tikrųjų, dėl 
Teisingumo Teismo aktyvumo tai buvo įtvirtinta kaip pirminis teisės įpareigojimas, kurio turi laikytis kiekviena nacionalinė 
institucija, galinti taikyti ar aiškinti Europos Sąjungos teisę. Atsižvelgiant į Europos Sąjungos sutarties 19 straipsnio 1 dalies 
antrą pastraipą, valstybės narės yra įpareigotos užtikrinti veiksmingą teisminę apsaugą srityse, kurioms taikoma Europos 
Sąjungos teisė, ir, remiantis Teismo pozicija byloje Associação Sindical de Juízes Portugueses, visi nacionaliniai teismai 
ir tribunolai, integruoti į nacionalinę teisių gynimo sistemą, galintys veikti kaip įprastas Europos teismas, privalo laikytis 
tam tikrų reikalavimų, kylančių iš tokios veiksmingos apsaugos, pavyzdžiui, teismų nepriklausomumo. Tik nešališkas ir 
nepriklausomas organas gali garantuoti asmens apsaugą ir institucinį pasitikėjimą.
Naujausios nacionalinių teismų sistemų įstatymų reformos Lenkijoje ir kitose valstybėse narėse pažeidžia teismų 
nepriklausomumo ir abipusio pasitikėjimo principus ir kelia teisinės valstybės idėjos krizę, todėl  reikėtų Europos Są-
jungos įsikišimo. Šiuo atžvilgiu Teisingumo Teismas pasinaudojo Portugalijos teisėjų praktika, kad išplėstų Sąjungos 
teisės taikymo sritį ir rastų būdą perimti valstybių narių teisminės organizacijos kontrolę. Tokiu būdu ši jurisprudencija 
tapo Teismo įsikišimo į teisinės valstybės pažeidimą Lenkijoje, vykusį dėl nacionalinę teismų sistemą reglamentuojančių 
įstatymų naujausių pakeitimų, alternatyva.
Abiem atvejais padaryti įstatymų pakeitimai, turintys įtakos teisėjams. Ta pati esmė, skirtingos detalės, leidusios pa-
sauliui pamatyti pirmuosius naujos eros žingsnius, kurie, viena vertus, gali pažaboti tokios pamatinės vertybės pažeidimą, 
bet, kita vertus, paspartinti tolesnę valstybių narių integraciją.
